The electric power network has long been subject to monopolization, encompassing production, transportation, and distribution sectors. However, recent liberalization efforts have introduced competition into the electricity market. To understand and manage this competition, game theory, a prominent tool in economics, is frequently employed. Specifically, competition within the electricity market has been analyzed through various game-theoretical models, including Bertrand's atomicity, Cournot's homogeneity, and Nash's research competition. These models aim to achieve the Cournot-Nash equilibrium, where each participant in the market makes optimal decisions given the strategies of others. To effectively allocate production and ensure a balance between supply and demand, as well as to maintain the stability of the interconnected network, one has adopted a method that combines Load Flow techniques with game theory principles. This hybrid approach enables a strategic distribution of power production, taking into account the competitive dynamics of the market. By integrating these methodologies, one can address the complexities of competition while ensuring efficient and stable operation of the power grid. This innovative approach not only enhances the management of electricity production and distribution but also fosters a more competitive and resilient power network. Moreover, the application of game theory in this context allows for a deeper understanding of strategic interactions among market participants. It helps in predicting behaviors, formulating strategies, and anticipating market changes, thus providing a robust framework for decision-making. This is particularly crucial in a liberalized market where multiple entities vie for market share and profitability. By employing game-theoretical insights, one can simulate various market scenarios, optimize resource allocation, and enhance overall market efficiency. Furthermore, this approach supports the integration of renewable energy sources by ensuring that their variable nature is accommodated within the grid's operational dynamics. In summary, the intersection of game theory and load flow methods offers a comprehensive solution to the challenges posed by a competitive electricity market, paving the way for a sustainable and efficient energy future.
Published in | International Journal of Energy and Power Engineering (Volume 13, Issue 3) |
DOI | 10.11648/j.ijepe.20241303.12 |
Page(s) | 52-62 |
Creative Commons |
This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, provided the original work is properly cited. |
Copyright |
Copyright © The Author(s), 2024. Published by Science Publishing Group |
Electricity Market, Competition, Load Flow, Game Theory, Interconnected Network, Cournot-Nash
For n=5 | For n=10 | For n=20 | |||
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Profits [Milliard ariary] | Power produced [MW] | Profits [Milliard ariary] | Power produced [MW] | Profits [Milliard ariary] | Power produced [MW] |
20,056 | 26,737 | 0,709 | 0,945 | 0,709 | 0,945 |
0,684 | 0,912 | 0,684 | 0,912 | 0,684 | 0,912 |
0,921 | 1,228 | 0,921 | 1,228 | 0,921 | 1,228 |
54,767 | 73,012 | 16,581 | 22,105 | 0,837 | 1,116 |
0,709 | 0,945 | 0,732 | 0,976 | 0,732 | 0,976 |
0,626 | 0,834 | 54,759 | 73,012 | ||
0,716 | 0,954 | 0,716 | 0,954 | ||
0,706 | 0,941 | 0,706 | 0,941 | ||
0,695 | 0,927 | 0,695 | 0,927 | ||
54,767 | 73,012 | 0,686 | 0,914 | ||
0,675 | 0,900 | ||||
0,665 | 0,873 | ||||
0,655 | 0,945 | ||||
0,709 | 0,912 | ||||
0,684 | 0,900 | ||||
9,385 | 12,513 | ||||
0,837 | 1,116 | ||||
0,732 | 0,976 | ||||
0,626 | 0,834 | ||||
0,716 | 0,954 |
HT | Haute Tension |
Jirama | Jiro sy Rano Malagasy |
MT | Moyenne Tension |
ORE | Office de Régulation de l’Electricité |
PIA | Poste d’Interconnexion d’Antananarivo |
RIA | Réseaux Interconnecté d’Antananarivo |
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APA Style
Voalintsoa, O., Randriamitantsoa, A. A., Rakotoniaina, S. H. (2024). Competitive Analysis at the Cournot-Nash Equilibrium of an Interconnected Network. International Journal of Energy and Power Engineering, 13(3), 52-62. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijepe.20241303.12
ACS Style
Voalintsoa, O.; Randriamitantsoa, A. A.; Rakotoniaina, S. H. Competitive Analysis at the Cournot-Nash Equilibrium of an Interconnected Network. Int. J. Energy Power Eng. 2024, 13(3), 52-62. doi: 10.11648/j.ijepe.20241303.12
AMA Style
Voalintsoa O, Randriamitantsoa AA, Rakotoniaina SH. Competitive Analysis at the Cournot-Nash Equilibrium of an Interconnected Network. Int J Energy Power Eng. 2024;13(3):52-62. doi: 10.11648/j.ijepe.20241303.12
@article{10.11648/j.ijepe.20241303.12, author = {Onja Voalintsoa and Andry August Randriamitantsoa and Solofo Hery Rakotoniaina}, title = {Competitive Analysis at the Cournot-Nash Equilibrium of an Interconnected Network }, journal = {International Journal of Energy and Power Engineering}, volume = {13}, number = {3}, pages = {52-62}, doi = {10.11648/j.ijepe.20241303.12}, url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijepe.20241303.12}, eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.ijepe.20241303.12}, abstract = {The electric power network has long been subject to monopolization, encompassing production, transportation, and distribution sectors. However, recent liberalization efforts have introduced competition into the electricity market. To understand and manage this competition, game theory, a prominent tool in economics, is frequently employed. Specifically, competition within the electricity market has been analyzed through various game-theoretical models, including Bertrand's atomicity, Cournot's homogeneity, and Nash's research competition. These models aim to achieve the Cournot-Nash equilibrium, where each participant in the market makes optimal decisions given the strategies of others. To effectively allocate production and ensure a balance between supply and demand, as well as to maintain the stability of the interconnected network, one has adopted a method that combines Load Flow techniques with game theory principles. This hybrid approach enables a strategic distribution of power production, taking into account the competitive dynamics of the market. By integrating these methodologies, one can address the complexities of competition while ensuring efficient and stable operation of the power grid. This innovative approach not only enhances the management of electricity production and distribution but also fosters a more competitive and resilient power network. Moreover, the application of game theory in this context allows for a deeper understanding of strategic interactions among market participants. It helps in predicting behaviors, formulating strategies, and anticipating market changes, thus providing a robust framework for decision-making. This is particularly crucial in a liberalized market where multiple entities vie for market share and profitability. By employing game-theoretical insights, one can simulate various market scenarios, optimize resource allocation, and enhance overall market efficiency. Furthermore, this approach supports the integration of renewable energy sources by ensuring that their variable nature is accommodated within the grid's operational dynamics. In summary, the intersection of game theory and load flow methods offers a comprehensive solution to the challenges posed by a competitive electricity market, paving the way for a sustainable and efficient energy future. }, year = {2024} }
TY - JOUR T1 - Competitive Analysis at the Cournot-Nash Equilibrium of an Interconnected Network AU - Onja Voalintsoa AU - Andry August Randriamitantsoa AU - Solofo Hery Rakotoniaina Y1 - 2024/07/02 PY - 2024 N1 - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijepe.20241303.12 DO - 10.11648/j.ijepe.20241303.12 T2 - International Journal of Energy and Power Engineering JF - International Journal of Energy and Power Engineering JO - International Journal of Energy and Power Engineering SP - 52 EP - 62 PB - Science Publishing Group SN - 2326-960X UR - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijepe.20241303.12 AB - The electric power network has long been subject to monopolization, encompassing production, transportation, and distribution sectors. However, recent liberalization efforts have introduced competition into the electricity market. To understand and manage this competition, game theory, a prominent tool in economics, is frequently employed. Specifically, competition within the electricity market has been analyzed through various game-theoretical models, including Bertrand's atomicity, Cournot's homogeneity, and Nash's research competition. These models aim to achieve the Cournot-Nash equilibrium, where each participant in the market makes optimal decisions given the strategies of others. To effectively allocate production and ensure a balance between supply and demand, as well as to maintain the stability of the interconnected network, one has adopted a method that combines Load Flow techniques with game theory principles. This hybrid approach enables a strategic distribution of power production, taking into account the competitive dynamics of the market. By integrating these methodologies, one can address the complexities of competition while ensuring efficient and stable operation of the power grid. This innovative approach not only enhances the management of electricity production and distribution but also fosters a more competitive and resilient power network. Moreover, the application of game theory in this context allows for a deeper understanding of strategic interactions among market participants. It helps in predicting behaviors, formulating strategies, and anticipating market changes, thus providing a robust framework for decision-making. This is particularly crucial in a liberalized market where multiple entities vie for market share and profitability. By employing game-theoretical insights, one can simulate various market scenarios, optimize resource allocation, and enhance overall market efficiency. Furthermore, this approach supports the integration of renewable energy sources by ensuring that their variable nature is accommodated within the grid's operational dynamics. In summary, the intersection of game theory and load flow methods offers a comprehensive solution to the challenges posed by a competitive electricity market, paving the way for a sustainable and efficient energy future. VL - 13 IS - 3 ER -